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The Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in CEO Bonus Compensation 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: In this study, we explore the relationship between the use of 
nonfinancial performance measures in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus plans and CEO 
power, moderated by compensation committee monitoring. Furthermore, we investigate 
whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures is associated with higher CEO 
bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of FTSE 350 firms during the period 2007-2013, 
we find that CEO power is significantly negatively related to the propensity of using 
nonfinancial performance measures. This negative relationship, however, is moderated by 
higher levels of compensation committee monitoring. We also find that firms combining 
nonfinancial and financial performance measures in CEO bonus plans tend to have stronger 
CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns than firms using financial measures alone. 
Thus, our results suggest that boards of directors adopting nonfinancial performance 
measures are able to better align CEO incentives with shareholder interests. We find similar 
results when using the weight of nonfinancial performance measures in the bonus plan in our 
analyses. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study empirically supports the managerial power 
theory whereby powerful CEOs influence the choice of performance measures in their bonus 
plans. However, effective compensation committees are found to attenuate the influence of 
powerful CEOs and to better align their interests with those of shareholders. Our result of 
stronger bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns for firms combining nonfinancial with 
financial performance measures implies that the informativeness of these measures enhances 
the firm’s ability to tie CEO bonus compensation to shareholder wealth.   
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to members of boards of 
directors, especially compensation committee members, who are interested in improving the 
design of executive incentive contracts to better align managerial incentives to shareholder 
interests. Furthermore, the findings inform regulators about the importance of alternative 
performance measures in pay-performance sensitivity and may warrant increased firm 
disclosure of the details of the pay structure. 
Key words: Corporate Governance; CEO Power; Compensation Committee Monitoring; 
CEO Bonus Compensation; Nonfinancial Performance Measures; Pay-performance 
Sensitivity. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we explore the relationship between the use of nonfinancial performance 
measures in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus compensation and CEO power, and the 
moderating role of the compensation committee monitoring on this relationship. Furthermore, 
we investigate whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus 
plans, alongside financial measures, is associated with higher CEO bonus pay sensitivity to 
shareholder returns. Prior literature finds that nonfinancial performance measures are 
informative about unobservable managerial actions and allow a more balanced assessment of 
the CEO’s performance (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Epstein and Roy, 2004; Schiehll 
and Bellavance, 2009). Therefore, we hypothesize that firms whose CEOs have greater power 
over the boards are less likely to use nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans.  
To test our hypothesis, we use a sample of FTSE firms in the United Kingdom (UK) 
during the period 2007-2013. We focus on a UK sample because a series of corporate 
governance reforms in the past decades has encouraged companies to implement 
performance-related compensation in the UK (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; UK 
Government, 2013), as well as requiring the formation of compensation committees 
consisting of independent directors (e.g. UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). We find that 
CEO power is significantly negatively related to the propensity of using nonfinancial 
performance measures in CEO bonus contracts. This is in line with the finding in Schiehll and 
Bellavance (2009) that the use of nonfinancial measures in incentive contracts may be a 
substitute for CEO ownership, a proxy for CEO power.  
CEO power is a relative concept based on the relationship between the CEO and other 
board members (Schiehll, Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2018). Therefore, we examine the 
moderating role of the compensation committee in the choice of nonfinancial performance 
measures. We find that effective compensation committee monitoring attenuates the influence 
of CEO power over board decisions. Specifically, the negative relationship between CEO 
power and the use of nonfinancial performance measures is less pronounced when the 
compensation committee monitoring function is more effective. We also investigate whether 
the use of nonfinancial performance measures, which are informative of CEO actions, in 
bonus compensation can strengthen CEO bonus pay-performance sensitivity. We expect and 
find that integrating nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans will help align 
CEO and shareholder interests. This effect is more pronounced when compensation 
committees are more independent. In addition, we find that CEO bonus pay sensitivity to 
shareholder returns becomes stronger as the contractual weight of nonfinancial performance 
measures increases.  
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we investigate the 
relative dynamics of CEO power and compensation committee monitoring in the choice of 
performance measures in CEO bonus plans. Our study extends prior work, such as Schiehll 
and Bellavance (2009), which tends to examine the stand-alone effect of CEO power and 
board monitoring on the choice of integrating nonfinancial performance measures in CEO 
bonus plans. Second, our measure of CEO power covers all four dimensions of power 
discussed by Finkelstein (1992). This contribution highlights the significance of our findings 
because prior studies tend to infer CEO power from one or two variables (e.g. duality and 
number of board members appointed following the CEO’s appointment in Ittner, Larcker, and 
Rajan, 1997; CEO ownership in Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). Third, we shed light on the 
monitoring role of compensation committees in an alternative setting of performance 
evaluation measure choices. Prior literature tends to investigate the committee’s role in 
decisions of executive compensation levels (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton, 1998) or 
pay structure (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003), rather than the choice of performance measures. 
Lastly and most importantly, our study is the first to report the positive impact of nonfinancial 
performance measures on the link between CEO bonus compensation and shareholder 
returns.  
Our results have important implications for boards of directors and policy makers, who 
are interested in aligning CEO and shareholder interests. Specifically, boards of directors and 
compensation committees may consider adopting nonfinancial performance measures in 
executive incentive contracts. Regulators may contemplate providing further 
recommendations on the choice of performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. 
Current regulations do not discuss this choice (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2018). 
Furthermore, regulators may improve pay-performance sensitivity if they require enhanced 
disclosure of CEO pay structure with detailed description of alternative performance 
measures in bonus plans.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the institutional 
environment of the UK and related literature in the next section. This is followed by the 
hypotheses development. The sample, estimation methods, regression models, and variables 
are then documented, followed by a discussion of the results. We present the conclusion, 
implications, and limitations in the last section.   
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK renders a unique setting for examining the choice of performance measures in 
executive compensation due to the extensive regulation on governance and 
performance-related pay. Specifically, the Cadbury report (Cadbury, 1992) recommended 
firms to set up compensation committees mainly consisting of non-executive directors. The 
Greenbury report (Greenbury, 1995) and the Hampel report (Hampel, 1998) further 
highlighted the importance of linking rewards to performance. In 1998, the Combined Code 
(renamed in 2010 as the Corporate Governance Code) integrated the recommendations from 
the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports. The importance of performance measures in 
executive compensation has been highlighted in several revisions of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. The 2016 version of the Code states that: ‘Executive directors’ 
remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term success of the company. 
Performance-related elements should be transparent, stretching and rigorously applied’ 
(Section D: Remuneration). However, in the latest version of 2018, reference to performance 
measures is minimal and the Code only requires compensation committees to provide the 
rationale for remuneration policies including any ‘performance metrics’ (Section 5; Provision 
41). 
Extant empirical research on the choice of performance measures in executive 
compensation is usually conducted using US data. However, there are some significant 
differences in the governance structure between the UK and US, including: the type of 
institutional investors (insurance companies and hedge funds in the UK; investment 
companies in the UK), the duality of the CEO/chairman role (rare in the UK; prominent in the 
US) and the engagement or monitoring of institutional investors (encouraged in the UK) 
(Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006). Our study adds the understanding of the role of 
performance measures used in CEO bonus compensation in the unique UK setting.  
 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
CEO Power, Monitoring and the Choice of Performance Measures 
Under agency theory, the goal of the board of directors is to incentivize and monitor 
CEOs to closely align their interests with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Lo and Wu, 2016). The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus plans is, therefore, an 
important consideration as a tool for incentivizing CEOs (Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). 
Boards of directors are expected to incorporate performance measures in bonus contracts if 
they are informative, providing incremental information about managerial actions 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989; Feltham and Xie, 1994). Firms usually rely on 
financial performance measures such as accounting earnings or stock returns in bonus 
contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1996). Prior 
studies suggest that nonfinancial performance measures provide incremental information 
about managerial actions that are not observable in financial measures (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992; Hemmer, 1996; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Said, HassabElnaby and Wier, 2003; 
Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Epstein and Roy, 2004). Therefore, we expect that boards 
of directors are inclined to adopt nonfinancial performance measures for their incremental 
information, conditional on factors like monitoring costs, resources or competition.  
Studies of managerial power theory contend that CEOs with high managerial power may 
influence board decisions on compensation so that the resulting compensation contracts are 
favorable for themselves (Hill and Phan, 1995; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bender and Moir, 
2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; van Essen, Otten, and Carberry, 2015). Prior research has 
also established the influence of CEOs in the governance structure in different contexts. For 
example, CEO power may limit the board’s influence over corporate strategies (Haynes and 
Hillman, 2010; Chin, Hambrick and Trevino, 2013; Zhu and Chen, 2015). A CEO who also 
serves as the chairman of the board of directors can decide the board meeting agenda and lead 
board meeting discussions (Finkelstein, 1992; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Ittner, Larcker and 
Rajan, 1997; Krause, Semadeni and Cannella, 2014). Furthermore, powerful CEOs have 
greater influence on the selection process of directors and are better positioned to limit board 
influence on important firm decisions (Finkelstein, 1992; Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; 
Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013).  
  If CEOs with greater power interfere with decisions of boards of directors on the 
choice of performance measures to favor themselves, we expect that they are less likely to 
adopt nonfinancial performance measures even if those measures may be future-oriented and 
informative of unobservable managerial actions. Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship 
between the propensity of using nonfinancial performance measures and CEO power as 
follows: 
H1a: Firms with greater CEO power are less likely to use nonfinancial performance measures 
in CEO bonus compensation. 
Power is defined as ‘the capacity of individual actors to exert their will’ and to achieve their 
goals in a particular relationship (Pfeffer, 1981; Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Finkelstein, 
1992; Schiehll, Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2018). However, power is a relative concept and 
depends on other organizational actors (Pfeffer, 1981; Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Shen 
and Cannella, 2002; Schiehll, Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2018). Both agency theory and 
managerial power theory suggest that effective board monitoring attenuates the influence of 
powerful CEOs on incentive contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Daily and Johnson, 1997; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; van Essen, Otten and Carberry, 2015). Prior studies find that boards 
with more effective monitoring, reflected through more independent boards, are, on average, 
in a better position to force CEOs to act in the shareholders’ interests (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998). Jensen and Meckling (1976) theoretically show that monitoring 
increases shareholder wealth but increases CEO’s wealth to a less extent by limiting 
non-pecuniary benefits, which the CEO could have enjoyed without monitoring. Therefore, 
we expect that effective board monitoring moderates the influence of a powerful CEO on 
incentive contract decisions of the board. Specifically, firms with powerful CEOs, if they are 
closely monitored by the boards of directors, would be relatively more inclined to include 
informative nonfinancial performance measures in bonus contracts than firms with powerful 
CEOs and weak board monitoring. To estimate the effect of board monitoring, we focus on 
the monitoring role of compensation committee since our study focuses on executive 
compensation (Newman and Mozes, 1999; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004; Conyon and He, 2004; Laux and Laux, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009). This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1b: The negative association between CEO power and the use of nonfinancial performance 
measures in CEO bonus compensation becomes weaker for firms with better compensation 
committee monitoring. 
Pay-performance Sensitivity and Nonfinancial Performance Measures 
Board decisions of performance measures have a direct impact on CEO compensation 
and its relation to shareholder returns. Extant research on executive compensation in the 
context of the UK has found a positive but weak relationship between the level of 
compensation and shareholder value (Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 1993; Conyon, 1997; 
Ozkan, 2011). Prior studies suggest that the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures 
in incentive contracts could promote the board’s assessment of managerial actions that are not 
publicly observable and in turn, enable the boards to better monitor the managers (Banker and 
Datar, 1989; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Sliwka, 2002; Banker, Potter and Srinivasan, 2005; 
Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). Therefore, we investigate whether combining nonfinancial 
with financial performance measures improves the relationship between CEO bonus 
compensation and shareholder wealth, irrespective of the influence of managerial power over 
board decisions.  
Prior studies report that nonfinancial and financial measures complement each other in 
reducing agency costs (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Ghosh and Wu, 2012). 
Nonfinancial measures are more forward-looking than financial measures (Ittner and Larcker 
1998; Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan, 2000; Said, HassabElnaby and Wier, 2003). 
Nonfinancial measures also discourage earnings manipulation (HassabElnaby, Mohamed and 
Said, 2010; Ibrahim and Lloyd, 2011). They provide for better managerial incentives, 
especially for firms with high growth rates or firms with noisy financial measures (Bushman, 
Indjejikian and Smith, 1996). Therefore, we expect that, if nonfinancial performance 
measures are included in bonus contracts, the positive relationship between CEO bonus 
compensation and shareholder returns (pay-performance sensitivity) will be stronger in the 
following hypothesis:   
H2: The sensitivity of CEO bonus compensation to shareholder returns is higher in firms that 
combine nonfinancial and financial performance measures than firms that rely on financial 
performance measures alone.  
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data and Sample  
For our sample, we use firms listed on the FTSE 350 index in the years 2007-2013. We 
focus on FTSE 350 firms following prior research on pay-performance sensitivity in the UK 
(Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni, 2003). Our starting year is 2007 since most governance 
variables specific to the compensation committee are available from 2007. We manually 
collect information about CEO bonus compensation and the type of performance measures 
from the annual reports. We also collect the contractual weight placed on nonfinancial 
performance measures, if disclosed. Nonfinancial measures are those that cannot be defined 
in financial terms and include measures such as customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, 
safety and environment, and other qualitative factors. Examples of other qualitative factors 
include personal objectives set for the CEO (e.g. 2012 annual report of Cairn, PLC) and 
initiatives such as increasing efficiencies and focusing on e-commerce (2012 annual report of 
Morrisons, PLC). 1  Data on stock returns and firm characteristics are collected from 
Datastream.  
We exclude observations from the financial sector as this sector has a special regulatory 
environment. We delete observations with no clear information of performance measures used 
in bonus plans or firms without CEO incentive plans. We further remove observations with 
partial-year CEO compensation to exclude any effects of changes in compensation contracts 
if new CEOs are appointed. Lastly, we exclude observations with any missing test variables 
specified in our regression models. We winsorize extreme values of our continuous 
independent variables, stock returns and return on equity, at one percent to avoid the influence 
of outliers.  
We obtain variables of CEO share ownership, board of directors’ share ownership, CEO 
tenure and age, compensation committee size and independence as well as compensation 
committee chair independence, from the governance database, NRG Metrics.2 These are used 
to measure CEO power and monitoring proxies. Our final sample consists of 1,097 firm-year 
observations of 204 firms with non-missing variables during the period 2007-2013. Out of 
these, 693 observations (63 percent) are for firms combining nonfinancial and financial 
performance measures in bonus compensation contracts.   
CEO Power Index 
To measure our proxy of CEO power, we develop a composite index, CEO Power, based 
on the four dimensions of power discussed by Finkelstein (1992) – structural power, 
ownership power, expert power and prestige power. We proxy for structural power with 
Duality, which takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise (Finkelstein and D’aveni, 1994; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Hu and Kumar, 
2004). We proxy for ownership power with Relative CEO Ownership Index, which takes the 
value of one if the ratio of shares held by the CEO to those held by other board members is 
greater than the median of our sample distribution, and zero otherwise. As an indicator of 
expertise power, we use CEO Tenure Index (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Hill and Phan, 
1991). CEO Tenure Index is coded as one if the number of years serving as a CEO is greater 
than the median of our sample distribution, and zero otherwise. We proxy for prestige power 
with CEO Age Index (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985), which takes the value of one if the 
CEO’s age is above the median sample distribution, and zero otherwise.  
Our index, CEO Power, is the sum of Duality, Relative CEO Ownership Index, CEO 
Tenure Index, and CEO Age Index, taking on values ranging from 0 to 4. A higher CEO 
Power indicates greater managerial power. Prior managerial power studies have used similar 
methodologies of combining multiple governance variables into an index variable (e.g. Han, 
Nanda and Silveri, 2016; Mathew, Ibrahim and Archbold, 2018).  
Monitoring Index 
While prior research tends to focus on the role of the board of directors in monitoring 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Combs et al., 2007; Schiehll, 
2008), we focus on the compensation committee in the setting of bonus compensation. To 
proxy for compensation committee monitoring, we identify several factors that may restrict 
CEO power or affect the quality of compensation committees, including compensation 
committee independence (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 1998), committee chair independence, and 
compensation committee size (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004; Song and Windram, 
2004; Sun and Cahan, 2009).   
Our first measure, Compensation Committee Independence Index takes the value one if 
the number of independent members of the committee of a firm is more than the median 
number of our sample distribution, and zero otherwise. Compensation Committee Chair 
Independence takes the value of one if the chair is an independent member of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise. Compensation Committee Size Index is coded as one if the 
number of committee members of a firm is greater than the median number of our sample 
distribution, and zero otherwise. 3  Our compensation committee monitoring variable, 
Monitoring, is the sum of Compensation Committee Independence Index, Committee Chair 
Independence, and Compensation Committee Size Index, ranging from 0 to 3. 
Research Methodology 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b investigate the relationship between CEO power and the 
propensity of using nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans, moderated by 
the effect of compensation committee monitoring. We use the following multivariate logistic 
regression model with robust standard errors:4 
Nonfinancialit = 1 CEO Powerit-1 + β2 CEO Powerit·Monitoringit-1 + 3 Monitoringit-1 + 
∑βkControlskit-1 + α + εit                 (1). 
Nonfinancial is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses nonfinancial performance 
measures in the CEO bonus plan, and zero otherwise, for firm i in year t (Said, HassabElnaby 
and Wier, 2003; Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). We also use an alternative measure, 
Nonfinancial Weight, which is the actual weight placed on nonfinancial measures in the bonus 
contract (zero for firms that use financial measures alone or actual weight of nonfinancial 
measures if provided). This weight measure is similar to that used in Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 
(1997).5  
Our independent test variables include CEO Power and Monitoring as well as the 
interaction term of CEO Power·Monitoring capturing the moderating effect of compensation 
committee monitoring. Hypothesis 1a expects a negative coefficient, 1 and Hypothesis 1b 
expects a positive coefficient, β2. We have no expectation about the stand-alone effect of 
Monitoring. Given that bonuses are paid (and their associated performance measures are 
disclosed) one year after the selection of performance measures by compensation committees 
(e.g. McKnight and Tomkins, 1999), lagged values of the independent variables are used in 
the model.  
We include several control variables. Firm Size is used to control for firm complexity 
and agency conflicts (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). It is measured as the log transformation of 
total assets at the end of year t (Garen, 1994). Firm Age is the number of years since the 
founding year (Cordeiro, He, Conyon and Shaw, 2013). Leverage proxies for firm’s risk and 
represents a firm’s capital structure; this is measured as total debts divided by total assets 
(Firth, Leung and Rui, 2010). Market-to-Book ratio controls for the firms’ growth opportunity, 
which is calculated as market capitalization divided by total shareholders’ equity (Firth, Fung 
and Rui, 2007). Financial Crisis is included to control for macroeconomic shocks, and it is 
equal to one if the observation is from the period 2007-2008, and zero otherwise (Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz, 2011). We include the Herfindahl Index, calculated as the sum of squared market 
share of the firm (percentage share of sales revenues within its industry) to control for 
competition (Chen, Matsumura, Shin and Wu, 2015). 6  Finally, Year and Industry are 
indicator variables of firm-year and industry membership. They are included to cater for year 
effects and to allow for cross-industry variation, respectively. 
Hypothesis 2 investigates whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures in 
bonus contracts enhances CEO bonus compensation sensitivity to shareholder returns. To test 
this hypothesis, we use the following model including an interaction term between 
Nonfinancial and annual stock returns (RET). We also include return on equity (ROE) as an 
alternative performance measure, and its interaction with the Nonfinancial variable as 
follows:   
Log(Bonusit) = β1RETit + β2Nonfinancialit·RETit + β3ROEit + β4Nonfinancialit·ROEit + 
β5Nonfinancialit +∑βkControlskit +α + εit                                    (2). 
Log(Bonus) is the log transformation of CEO bonus of firm i in year t. We use the log 
transformation of the bonus level to mitigate the problem of skewed distributions (Andreas, 
Rapp and Wolff, 2012; Conyon and He, 2012). RET is annual stock returns, excluding 
dividends, as in Conyon and He (2011). ROE is return on equity, which is net income divided 
by total shareholders’ equity. We use both RET and ROE in the regression to capture both 
market and accounting performance (Leone, Wu and Zimmerman, 2006; Shaw and Zhang, 
2010).7 We control for Board Size and Board Independence in addition to the control 
variables in Equation (1) because governance mechanisms can reduce conflicts of interests 
between the CEO and shareholders and affect the pay-performance sensitivity (Ozkan, 2011). 
 We use the fixed-effect panel data estimation for Equation (2), as in Schaefer (1998), 
since pay and other firm-related characteristics may not vary across time. Standard errors are 
clustered by firms, and year dummies control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
(Petersen, 2009).  
We focus on CEO bonus compensation not on long-term or total compensation in our 
analyses for two reasons. First, firms in the UK were not formally required to disclose a 
single total compensation figure for executives until the “2013 reforms” (UK Government, 
2013). Prior to 2013, many firms chose to report cash-related compensation rather than a 
single total figure and data on long-term incentive pay were not always quantified in the 
reports. Second, long-term pay is usually tied to financial performance measures only 
(Ibrahim and Lloyd, 2011).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics  
We begin by presenting the distribution of our sample across the sample period and 
across industries designated by FTSE. The sample distribution is shown separately for 
observations of firms that use financial and nonfinancial performance measures and those that 
use financial measures alone in their CEO bonus plans. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 
nonfinancial performance measures have become more popular over the sample period (from 
59 percent of the observations in 2007 to 66 percent in 2013). The number of firms relying on 
financial performance measures alone has declined over time, from a high of 66 firms in 2008 
to a low of 45 in 2013. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the highest number of observations 
belongs to the industrials industry (financial measures alone, N = 171; both financial and 
nonfinancial measures, N = 196). The second largest industry is the consumer services 
industry (financial measures alone, N = 89; both financial and nonfinancial measures, N = 
189). More than 80 percent of the observations in the health care (91.11 percent), oil and gas 
(82.35 percent), and telecommunications (82.05 percent) industries adopt both financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures in our sample.      
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average bonus of 
CEOs in our sample is £567,400. On average, 63 percent of the sample observations combine 
nonfinancial and financial performance measures in CEO bonus plans with Nonfinancial = 1, 
which represents 693 observations. Out of these 693 observations, 426 have disclosed 
information on the values of Nonfinancial Weight and the average Nonfinancial Weight is 26 
percent. Mean stock returns RET and return on equity ROE are both 17 percent. The number 
of years for which the CEOs in our sample have been in office is on average 6.7 years and 
their average age is 52 years. Only 2 percent of CEOs in our sample combine both roles of 
CEO and Chairman of the board (mean Duality = 2 percent). In terms of compensation 
committee variables, we find that the committees tend to be fully independent (mean 
Compensation Committee Independence = 0.90) with an independent chair (mean Compensation 
Committee Chair Independence = 0.96). Firms in the sample are well established with mean 
Firm Age of 67 years and mean Leverage of 30 percent.  
Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the test variables in firms that use financial 
performance measures alone compared to those that combine nonfinancial with financial 
performance measures. The stock returns for firms using nonfinancial performance measures 
as well (mean RET = 16 percent) are statistically indifferent from those using financial 
measures alone (mean RET = 17 percent). The two groups differ in terms of CEO Power and 
Monitoring. Specifically, the mean CEO Power is 1.69 in firms using financial measures 
alone but 1.52 in firms using both financial and nonfinancial measures. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The mean Monitoring is 2.2 in firms using 
financial measures alone compared to 2.3 in firms using financial and nonfinancial measures 
(significantly different at the 5 percent level).  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between our key variables. 
Log(Bonus) is positively correlated with Nonfinancial with a correlation coefficient of 0.07, 
significant at the 5 percent level. However, Log(Bonus) is not significantly related to CEO 
Power or Monitoring. Nonfinancial is significantly related to several variables including: 
ROE (coefficient -0.10, significant at the 1 percent level), CEO Power (coefficient -0.08, 
significant at the 1 percent level) and Monitoring (coefficient 0.06, significant at the 5 percent 
level Board Size and Firm Size are highly correlated with the coefficient of 0.57, significant at 
the 1 percent level. Overall, it is unlikely that our regressions have multicollinearity issues. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Results of Hypotheses 1a and 1b: CEO Power, Monitoring and Nonfinancial Measures 
Table 4 presents the results of Hypotheses 1a and 1b using Equation (1), investigating the 
association between CEO power and the propensity of using nonfinancial performance 
measures in CEO bonus plans, as well as the moderating effect of monitoring. In column 1, 
we find that CEO Power has a negative coefficient of -1.09, significant at the 1 percent level. 
This result supports Hypothesis 1a and suggests that firms are less likely to include 
nonfinancial measures in CEO bonus compensation plans when the CEO has more 
managerial power. The coefficient of CEO Power·Monitoring is positive and significant 
(coefficient is 0.38, significant at the 1 percent level), supporting Hypothesis 1b. That is, the 
influence of CEO power on board decisions is attenuated by stronger boards through an 
effective compensation committee monitoring. The first column of Table 4 also shows that the 
coefficient on Monitoring is insignificant and large firms are more likely to adopt 
nonfinancial measures (coefficient of Firm Size is 0.47, significant at the 1 percent level). We 
also find a negative coefficient of Leverage, indicating that more leveraged firms are less 
likely to use nonfinancial performance measures, consistent with prior studies (Opler and 
Titman, 1994; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Said, HassabElnaby and Wier, 2003). 
However, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.   
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
The second column of Table 4 reports the results with the alternative dependent variable, 
Nonfinancial Weight. Similar to the results with Nonfinancial, we find a negative association 
between CEO Power and Nonfinancial Weight (coefficient is -0.04, significant at the 5 
percent level). The interaction term of CEO Power with Monitoring is positive and significant 
(coefficient is 0.01, significant at the 10 percent level). This result is similar to findings in 
Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), whereby they report that CEOs with greater influence over 
the board of directors are less likely to be compensated based on nonfinancial measures.8 The 
second column of Table 4 also reports that larger firms tend to place more weight on 
nonfinancial performance measures (coefficient of Firm Size is 0.03, significant at the 1 
percent level). Furthermore, Leverage is negatively related to Nonfinancial Weight 
(significant at the 10 percent level). 
To visualize the effect of CEO Power and Monitoring on the choice of nonfinancial 
performance measures we present, in Figure 1, a plot of the association between CEO Power 
and the use of nonfinancial performance measures, at different levels of Monitoring. The plot 
indicates a negative relationship between CEO Power and the use of nonfinancial measures 
(Nonfinancial), with a negative slope. However, the negative relationship is less pronounced 
at higher levels of committee monitoring. Specifically, the negative slope is steeper when the 
level of compensation committee monitoring is low (Monitoring = 0 or 1; represented by 
solid line), compared to when Monitoring is high (Monitoring = 2 or 3; represented by dashed 
line). This is in line with the results in Table 4 showing the moderating effect of Monitoring 
on the negative relationship between CEO power and the propensity of use of nonfinancial 
performance measures (Nonfinancial). 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that while firms with powerful CEOs 
are less likely to adopt nonfinancial performance measures, the influence of powerful CEOs 
is tempered by effective compensation committee monitoring. Our results are consistent with 
Schiehll and Bellavance (2009), which report that more independent boards integrate more 
nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans because insider-dominated boards 
may not want to include these costly nonfinancial measures.  
Results of Hypothesis 2: Bonus Pay Sensitivity to Shareholder Returns and Nonfinancial 
Performance Measures 
Hypothesis 2 investigates whether firms with nonfinancial performance measures have 
stronger bonus pay-sensitivity to shareholder returns. The first column of Table 5 presents 
regression results of Equation (2). The coefficient of the interaction term, Nonfinancial·RET, 
is 1.13, significantly positive at the 5 percent level. This result suggests that firms combining 
nonfinancial and financial performance measures enhance CEO bonus pay sensitivity to 
shareholder returns, supporting Hypothesis 2. We also find a significant and positive 
coefficient on Nonfinancial·ROE, which suggests the higher sensitivity of bonus pay to 
accounting performance for those firms combining nonfinancial and financial measures 
(coefficient is 0.73, significant at the 10 percent level). We find higher bonus pay in larger 
firms (coefficient on Firm Size is 0.41, significant at the 1 percent level), with higher board 
independence (coefficient is 2.70, significant at the 1 percent level) and during the financial 
crisis (coefficient on Financial Crisis is 0.63, significant at the 5 percent level). We also find 
lower bonus pay in more competitive industries (coefficient on Herfindahl Index is-5.15, 
significant at the 1 percent level).  
The overall explanatory power of our model is 7 percent, which is similar to extant pay 
sensitivity models with cash compensation based on UK data. For example, Ozkan (2011) 
reports an R2 of 2 percent from their model of change in log cash pay on log of shareholder 
returns (Table 3, p. 275). Unlike our study, prior research with higher explanatory power 
tends to use long-term pay based or US data. For example, Conyon and Murphy (2000) report 
an R2 of 31 percent in pay-performance regressions using US and UK data (Table 4, p. F654). 
Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2003) report an R2 of 33 percent in pay-performance 
regressions using cash and long-term pay (Table II, p. 1721).   
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
The second column in Table 5 presents the results using Nonfinancial Weight as an 
alternative to Nonfinancial in Equation (2). We find pay-performance sensitivity to be higher 
when the weight placed on nonfinancial performance measures is higher (coefficient of 
Nonfinancial Weight·RET is 2.72), although this is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. We also find that Board Independence and Firm Size are positively related to 
Log(Bonus), while Herfindahl Index is negatively related to Log(Bonus).   
We present in Figure 2 a plot of the pay-performance sensitivity for firms that employ 
financial performance measures alone (Nonfinancial = 0) and those that combine nonfinancial 
with financial performance measures (Nonfinancial = 1), using RET as a proxy for 
shareholder wealth. The plot shows a positive relationship between CEO bonus and 
shareholder returns and the positive relationship is stronger for firms combining nonfinancial 
and financial performance measures (dashed line with Nonfinancial = 1) than firms using 
financial measures alone. This is in line with the optimal contracting theory, implying that 
once firms adopt nonfinancial performance measures, the informative nature of nonfinancial 
measures facilitates a stronger tie between CEO bonus pay and stock returns.  
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
Bonus Pay Sensitivity to Shareholder Returns and Nonfinancial Performance Measures 
– Effect of Monitoring 
In the tests of Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we report that firms with higher CEO power are less 
likely to use nonfinancial performance measures and this result is attenuated by more 
effective board monitoring. In this section, we further investigate the impact of board 
monitoring on the pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder returns. We estimate Equation 
(2) after dividing our sample into two groups based on the level of board monitoring: a group 
with high compensation committee independence (all members of committee are independent; 
N=702) and a group with low committee independence (at least one member is not 
independent; N=395).  
The results are presented in Table 6. The results show that the coefficient on 
Nonfinancial·RET is significant for firms with high committee independence (1.39, 
significant at the 5 percent level), but not for firms with low committee independence 
(coefficient of Nonfinancial·RET is 0.45 and insignificant). Our results suggest that when 
nonfinancial performance measures are integrated in incentive contracts, they help align 
interests of CEOs and shareholders, and this result is stronger for firms with more effective 
compensation committee monitoring.9  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
Robustness Tests 
Alternative measures of CEO Power 
As robustness tests of Hypothesis 1, we use three alternative measures of CEO Power. The 
first alternative is an index measure based on Duality, CEO Tenure Index and CEO Age Index in 
addition to an alternative CEO ownership variable, CEO Ownership Index, which is set as one 
if the actual percentage of shares held by the CEO is above 3 percent, zero otherwise. This 
index is similar to the index in Veprauskaite and Adams (2013). We add Duality, CEO Tenure 
Index, CEO Age Index and CEO Ownership Index and the resulting index ranges from 0 to 4. 
The second alternative index for CEO power is measured by adding Duality and Relative 
CEO Ownership Index, excluding CEO Tenure Index and CEO Age Index. The resulting index 
takes values from 0 to 2. We exclude the latter two variables given that more appropriate 
variables for tenure and age are those of the CEO relative to tenure and age of other board 
members. However, we do not have data on other board member characteristics. As the third 
alternative, we use CEO Tenure alone as a proxy of CEO power (e.g. Hill and Phan, 1991), 
which ranges from 1 to 42. All results (untabulated) remain qualitatively the same across the 
three alternatives of CEO Power. 
Control for selection bias 
Our results show the importance of CEO power and board monitoring in the choice of 
performance evaluation measures. We contemplate that it is possible that firms adopt 
nonfinancial measures because they are more likely to have superior performance results of 
nonfinancial measures. Thus, we control for the potential selection bias associated with CEO 
power and other omitted variables in our tests for Hypothesis 2. To address the problem, we 
rerun our tests using a two-stage regression methodology, which is similar to the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable estimator method. In the first stage model 
(untabulated), we regress the propensity of adopting nonfinancial performance measure 
(Nonfinancial) on CEO Power, Monitoring and other lagged control variables presented in 
Table 4 (excluding the interaction term CEO Power .Monitoring, RET and ROE). Lagged 
Firm Size and lagged Leverage control for the political pressure or regulatory environment 
and the financial condition of the firm (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Said, HassabElnaby 
and Wier, 2003). In addition, we separately estimate the first stage model with Nonfinancial 
Weight as a dependent variable. Given that Nonfinancial Weight is a continuous variable, we 
use ordinary least square regressions with clustered standard errors.  
In the second stage estimation, we use the predicted propensity of using nonfinancial 
measures (as well as predicted Nonfinancial Weight) estimated from the first stage model and 
replace Nonfinancial or Nonfinancial Weight with their predicted values in Equation (2). 
Table 7 shows that the results are similar to our main results in Table 5. Specifically, firms 
using nonfinancial performance measures enjoy a significant improvement of bonus 
pay-sensitivity to shareholder returns with a significantly positive coefficient of 5.78 for the 
interaction term Nonfinancial·RET at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of Nonfinancial 
Weight·RET is also positive and significant (19.84, significant at the 1 percent level).  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
Control for effect of interaction terms 
When including interaction terms in regressions, the coefficients of the main effect may 
suffer multicollinearity problems. Therefore, we follow Bellavance, Landry and Schiehll 
(2013) and center RET and ROE, by subtracting the sample mean of each variable from each 
observation’s value of RET and ROE. Using the centered values of RET and ROE, we rerun 
Equation (2). The results (untabulated) indicate that the coefficient of Nonfinancial is 
insignificant and the coefficients of RET and ROE as well as their interaction terms with 
Nonfinancial remain unchanged to those reported in Table 5.  
Alternative approach to testing Hypothesis 2 
We perform an alternative approach for Hypothesis 2 to directly test the relationship 
between pay-performance sensitivity and the propensity of combining financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures. Specifically, we estimate CEO bonus pay sensitivity to 
shareholder returns for each firm and term the resulting variable as PPS. To estimate PPS for 
each firm we use a mixed model with random coefficients as follows: 
Log(Bonusit)= β1i RETit + αi +εit             (3) 
 
The firm-specific coefficient 1i represents PPS for each firm. We investigate whether PPS is 
stronger for firms combining both performance measures in the following regression: 
PPSit=β1Nonfinancialit+∑βkControlskit + α +εit           (4)  
 
We expect a positive and significant coefficient 1 in Hypothesis 2. We also use Nonfinancial 
Weight as an alternative to Nonfinancial. The results are presented in Table 8. The first 
column in Table 8 shows a positive and significant relationship between PPS and 
Nonfinancial (coefficient of Nonfinancial is 0.15, significant at the 1 percent level). The 
coefficient is also positive and significant when using Nonfinancial Weight as the independent 
variable (coefficient of Nonfinancial Weight is 0.34, significant at the 1 percent level) as 
reported in the second column.      
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
Alternative measure of bonus pay 
We replicate the analysis in Table 5 using the percentage change in bonus from year t-1 to 
year t as an alternative measure of the dependent variable, Log(Bonus). We include only RET 
as the performance variable, following Jensen and Murphy (1990). The results (untabulated) 
are similar to those in Table 5.  
Control for CEO share ownership 
Nonfinancial performance measures and CEO ownership may be substitute incentive 
mechanisms (Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). CEOs with high share ownership may have 
stronger incentives to increase their pay sensitivity to shareholder returns, not necessarily 
because they are evaluated by nonfinancial performance measures. Our results also show that 
higher CEO Power, which includes ownership power, is associated with less use of 
nonfinancial performance measures. Therefore, we control for CEO share ownership for 
Hypothesis 2. We rerun Equation (2) including the percentage of share ownership by CEOs as 
an additional control variable. We find (untabulated) that the coefficient of the CEO ownership 
variable is negative and significant (-0.04, significant at the 10 percent level), which is in line 
with the substitution effect of bonus pay and share ownership. The coefficient on 
Nonfinancial·RET remains significant (1.10, significant at the 1 percent level).  
In addition, we examine the use of nonfinancial performance measures across alternative 
levels of CEO ownership. This is in line with Ikäheimo, Kallunki, Moilanen, and Schiehll 
(2018) who try to disentangle whether employee pay represents incentive compensation or 
profit sharing through analyzing the variability of performance-based pay of three groups of 
employees (those with high, middle and low levels of task complexity).  We divide our sample 
into those with low (less than 3 percent), medium (above 3 and less than 10 percent) and high 
(above 10 percent) levels of CEO ownership. For firms with the lowest CEO ownership, 63 
percent of the observations use a combination of financial and nonfinancial measures in bonus 
plans. For firms with medium share ownership, 89 percent of the observations use both types of 
performance measures. For firms with high CEO ownership, 50 percent of the observations 
employ nonfinancial performance measures. Therefore, there is no significant trend of higher 
or lower prevalence of using nonfinancial performance measures at different levels of CEO 
ownership. Overall, our main results are not likely to be driven by the substitution effect of 
CEO ownership. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines the association between managerial power and the use of 
nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans, moderated by the monitoring role of 
compensation committees, and whether using nonfinancial performance measures is 
associated with increases in CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns. Based on a 
sample of FTSE firms during the period 2007-2013, we find that firms with higher CEO 
power are less likely to use nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus compensation 
plans, consistent with the managerial power theory. However, we find that the influence of 
powerful CEOs over the board’s decision of adopting nonfinancial measures is weakened by 
effective compensation committee monitoring. Specifically, the negative association between 
CEO power and the use of informative nonfinancial performance measures in bonus plans is 
less pronounced at higher levels of compensation committee monitoring. Our study 
contributes to the prior work on the choice of nonfinancial performance measures such as 
Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) and Schiehll and Bellavance (2009).  
We also document higher pay-performance sensitivity in firms that have integrated these 
nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus plans. Nonfinancial measures tend to 
discourage myopic CEO incentives associated with the traditional financial performance 
measures and improve the incentive power of compensation for maximizing shareholder 
returns. We also find that bonus pay-sensitivity to shareholder returns is stronger for firms 
placing more contractual weight on nonfinancial performance measures. Furthermore, we find 
that the improvement in pay-performance sensitivity from using nonfinancial performance 
measures is higher for firms with stronger compensation committee monitoring. These 
findings contribute to the literature on pay-performance sensitivity (e.g. Ozkan, 2011) by 
presenting the impact of the choice of performance measures on pay-performance sensitivity 
in the UK setting.  
Our study provides the following practical implications. First, our results shed light on 
the importance of considering not only the role of the CEO but also the moderating effect of 
compensation committees in compensation-setting. Therefore, it highlights the value of 
strengthening the corporate governance structure to mitigate CEO’s power in influencing the 
design of compensation contracts. Further regulation may be needed to enhance the 
committee’s role in the governance structure. Second, we show that the incentive power of 
compensation for maximizing shareholder value is improved by including nonfinancial 
performance measures in CEO bonus compensation plans. The board of directors and its 
compensation committee should pay more attention to the combination of financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures when designing executive compensation contracts.  
Our study has some limitations. Our measure of compensation is only captured by cash 
compensation, as data on total compensation is not fully available in the UK for our sample 
period. However, we believe that the impact of this limitation on our results is minimal given 
that the use of nonfinancial measures is predominant only in bonus compensation (Ibrahim 
and Lloyd, 2011). Furthermore, we rely on a sample of large firms in the UK and therefore 
results may not be generalizable in smaller firms in the UK or in firms in other countries.  
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Sample Distribution by Use of Nonfinancial and Financial Performance Measures 
 




Both Financial and 
Nonfinancial Measures 
Total 
Year N % N % N 
2007 60 41.38% 85 58.62% 145 
2008 66 39.76% 100 60.24% 166 
2009 55 32.35% 115 67.65% 170 
2010 66 37.08% 112 62.92% 178 
2011 56 36.84% 96 63.16% 152 
2012 56 36.36% 98 63.64% 154 
2013 45 34.09% 87 65.91% 132 
Total 404 36.83% 693 63.17% 1,097 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
  
Financial Measures  
Alone 
Both Financial and 
Nonfinancial Measures 
Total 
Industry N % N % N 
Basic Materials 15 18.52% 66 81.48% 81 
Consumer Goods 71 51.08% 68 48.92% 139 
Consumer Services 89 32.01% 189 67.99% 278 
Health Care 4 8.89% 41 91.11% 45 
Industrials 171 46.59% 196 53.41% 367 
Oil and Gas 15 17.65% 70 82.35% 85 
Technology 32 50.79% 31 49.21% 63 
Telecommunications 7 17.95% 32 82.05% 39 







Panel A:Full sample (N=1,097)         
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 
CEO Bonus (£000) 567.40 441.00 215.00 725.00 
Log(bonus) 11.76 13.00 12.28 13.49 
Nonfinancial 0.63 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Nonfinancial Weight (N=426) 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.30 
RET 0.17 0.12 -0.14 0.38 
ROE 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.25 
Total Assets (£Millions) 9,329 1,760 753 4,325 
CEO Ownership Share Ratio 5.01 0.69 0.24 1.55 
CEO Tenure 6.72 5.00 3.00 9.00 
CEO Age 52.27 52.00 48.00 56.00 
Duality 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Compensation Committee Independence 0.90 1.00 0.80 1.00 
Compensation Committee Size 4.15 4.00 3.00 5.00 
Compensation Committee Chair Independence 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Board Size  9.20 9.00 7.00 10.00 
Board Independence 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.70 
Firm Size 21.45 21.29 20.44 22.19 
Firm Age  67.33 42.00 20.00 104.00 
Leverage 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.38 
Market-to-book 4.27 2.53 1.42 4.27 
Financial Crisis  0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Herfindahl Index 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
 
Panel B: Comparison of firms using financial measures alone and those combining financial and 
nonfinancial measures 
 
Financial Measures  
Alone 









Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
RET 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.32 
 
ROE 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.13 3.18 *** 
CEO Power 1.69 2.00 1.52 2.00 16.85 *** 
Monitoring 2.23 2.00 2.32 2.00 8.35 ** 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all variables in the full sample. CEO Bonus = annual bonus of CEO; 
Log(Bonus) = Log transformation of the annual CEO bonus (+1); Nonfinancial = 1 if a firm includes 
nonfinancial performance measures in its CEO’s annual bonus compensation plans, 0 otherwise; Nonfinancial 
Weight = the relative weight placed on nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus compensation, when 
disclosed; RET = Annualized stock return; ROE = Return on equity measured as net income divided by total 
shareholders’ equity; Total Assets = Total assets of firm at end of year; CEO Ownership Share Ratio = total 
shares owned by CEO divided by total shares owned by other board members; CEO Tenure = number of years 
CEO has been in position; CEO Age = age of CEO; Duality = 1 if the CEO also holds title of Chairman of the 
board, 0 otherwise; Compensation Committee Independence = percentage of committee members classified as 
independent; Compensation Committee Size = number of members of committee; Compensation Committee 
Chair Independence = 1 if committee chair is independent, 0 otherwise; Board Size = number of members of 
board of directors; Board Independence = percentage of board members classified as independent; Firm Size = 
log transformation of the book value of total assets in year; Firm Age = The number of years since the firm’s 
founding year; Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; Market-to-book = market value of shares divided 
by total assets; Financial Crisis = 1 if the observation is during the period 2007-2008, 0 otherwise; Herfindahl 
Index = sum of squared market share of the firm, where a firm’s market share is its percentage share of sales 
revenues within its industry; Panel B presents mean and median for the main test variables in firms that use 
financial measures in CEO bonus plans alone and those that combine financial and nonfinancial measures. CEO 
Power = Index representing power of CEO; Monitoring = Index representing effectiveness of monitoring of the 
board through the compensation committee; ** and *** represent significance at 5% and 1%, respectively, using 




  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   
1. Log(Bonus) 1                          
2. Nonfinancial 0.07 ** 1                        
3. RET 0.06 ** -0.01  1                      
4. ROE 0.05  -0.10 *** -0.01  1                    
5. CEO Power 0.00  -0.08 *** 0.02  0.03  1                  
6. Monitoring  -0.01  0.06 ** 0.00  -0.01  0.00  1                
7. Board Size 0.12 *** 0.17 *** -0.07 ** -0.02  0.02  0.11 *** 1              
8. Board 
Independence 
0.12 *** 0.22 *** 0.01  0.03  -0.02  0.08 *** 0.12 *** 1            
9. Firm Size  0.18 *** 0.28 *** -0.08 *** -0.04  0.02  0.06 ** 0.57 *** 0.32 *** 1          
10 Firm Age  0.00  -0.11 *** -0.03  0.04  -0.04  0.09 *** -0.05  -0.02  0.01  1        
11. Leverage 0.03  -0.12 *** -0.02  0.07 ** -0.09 *** -0.08 *** 0.01  -0.06 * -0.07 ** 0.00  1      
12. Market-to- 
book 
0.03  -0.10 *** 0.03  0.21 *** -0.02  0.06 ** 0.00  0.05 * -0.08 *** -0.06 * 0.14 *** 1    
13. Financial 
Crisis  
0.02  -0.05  -0.44 *** -0.02  -0.07 ** -0.02  0.04  -0.10 *** -0.04  -0.01  0.09 *** 0.03  1  
14. Herfindahl 
Index 
-0.09 *** 0.04   0.09 *** -0.01   0.04   -0.07 ** -0.01   0.07 ** 0.05 * 0.06 * -0.10 *** -0.03   -0.07 ** 
All variables are defined in Table 2; *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
TABLE 4 
Effect of Managerial Power on the Propensity of Using Nonfinancial Measures 
 
The table presents coefficients (p-values) from the following regression: 
Nonfinancialit = β1CEO Powerit-1 + 2CEO Powerit-1·Monitoringit-1 + 3Monitoringit-1 + ∑βkControlski,t-1  
+ α + εit,   (1) 
where Nonfinancialit is replaced with Nonfinancial Weightit in the second column. 
Dependent Variable = Nonfinancial Nonfinancial Weight 
Independent Variable     





























































































Constant -7.41 *** -0.49 *** 







R2     0.19 
 
Industry = Industry indicator based on 8 FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industries; Year = 
Fiscal year indicator based on the sample period 2007-2013; All other variables are defined in Table 2; *, **, 





Effect of Nonfinancial Performance Measures on CEO Bonus Pay Sensitivity to 
Shareholder Returns  
 
The table presents coefficients (p-values) from the following regression: 
Log(Bonusit)= β1RETit + β2Nonfinancialit·RETit +β3ROEit + β4Nonfinancialit·ROEit + β5Nonfinancialit  
+∑βkControlskit + α +εit,  (2) 
where Nonfinancialit is replaced with Nonfinancial Weightit  as an alternative independent variable in the second 
column.                                         
Independent Variable Nonfinancial Nonfinancial Weight 
RET 0.24  0.32  
 (0.59)  (0.46)  
Nonfinancial·RET 1.13 ** 2.72  
 (0.03)  (0.16)  
ROE -0.11  -0.15  
 (0.71)  (0.60)  
Nonfinancial· ROE 0.73 * 1.35  
 (0.06)  (0.25)  







Board Size 0.05  0.07  
 
(0.43)  (0.31)  
Board Independence 2.70 *** 2.99 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  
Firm Size  0.41 *** 0.51 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  
Firm Age  0.00  
0.00  
 
(0.63)  (0.83)  
Leverage  0.73  
1.44  
 
(0.37)  (0.14)  
Market-to-book 0.01  0.01  
 
(0.34)  (0.47)  
Financial Crisis 0.63 ** 0.47  
 
(0.03)  (0.18)  
Herfindahl Index -5.15 *** -3.91 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.02)  
Industry  Yes 
 
Yes  






  (0.80)   (0.39)   
Observations 1,097  830  
R2 0.07   0.07   




Effect of Nonfinancial Measures on CEO Bonus Pay Sensitivity to Shareholder Returns 
- High versus Low Committee Independence 
 
The table presents coefficients (p-values) from the following regression: 
Log(Bonusit)= β1RETit + β2Nonfinancialit·RETit +β3ROEit + β4Nonfinancialit·ROEit + β5Nonfinancialit  
+∑βkControlskit + α +εit,  (2) 
All variables are defined in Table 2; *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; 
Low committee independence is the group of firms where at least one member of the compensation committee is 
not independent; High committee independence is the group of firms where all members of the compensation 









RET 0.97  -0.04  
 (0.25)  (0.94)  
Nonfinancial·RET 0.45  1.39 ** 
 
(0.64)  (0.02)  
ROE  -0.11  -0.29  
 (0.83)  (0.42)  
Nonfinancial·ROE 0.92  0.88 * 
 (0.41)  (0.05)  
Nonfinancial -0.14  -0.02  
 (0.79)  (0.95)  
Board Size 0.11  0.01  
 (0.22)  (0.87)  
Board Independence 2.55  2.89 ** 
 (0.16)  (0.04)  
Firm Size 0.36 * 0.43 *** 
 
(0.05)  (0.00)  
Firm Age 0.00  0.00  
 
(0.22)  (0.11)  
Leverage  0.08  1.15  
 
(0.95)  (0.26)  
Market-to-Book 0.06  0.01  
 
(0.30)  (0.52)  
Financial Crisis 0.30  0.81 ** 
 (0.55)  (0.03)  
Herfindahl Index -8.50 ** -3.42 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.04)  
Industry  Yes  Yes  
Year  Yes  Yes  
Constant 1.56  -0.18  
  (0.65)   (0.94)   
Observations 395  702  
R2 0.09   0.08   
TABLE 7  
Effect of Nonfinancial Measures on CEO Bonus Pay Sensitivity to Shareholder Returns 
– Two-stage regressions 
 
The table presents coefficients (p-values) from the following regression: 
Log(Bonusit)= β1RETit + β2Nonfinancialit·RETit +β3ROEit + β4Nonfinancialit·ROEit + β5Nonfinancialit 
+∑βkControlskit + α +εit,  (2) 
where Nonfinancialit is replaced with Nonfinancial Weightit in the second column.  
Independent Variable Nonfinancial Nonfinancial Weight 
RET -2.81 *** -1.92 ** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
 
Nonfinancial·RET 5.78 *** 19.84 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
ROE -1.02  -0.43 
 
 
(0.14)  (0.54) 
 
Nonfinancial·ROE 2.04 * 3.64 
 
 
(0.07)  (0.39) 
 
Nonfinancial -5.55 *** -14.98 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.01) 
 
Board Size 0.02  0.06  
 (0.77)  (0.48)  
Board Independence 3.35 *** 3.63 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  
Firm Size 0.81 *** 0.88 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Firm Age 0.00  0.00 
 
 
(0.18)  (0.14) 
 
Leverage  0.07  1.16 
 
 
(0.95)  (0.41) 
 
Market-to-book 0.01  0.02 
 
 
(0.76)  (0.46) 
 
Financial Crisis 0.22  0.01 
 
 
(0.60)  (0.98) 
 
Herfindahl Index -5.13 *** -4.15 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.05) 
 
Industry  Yes  Yes 
 
Year  Yes  Yes 
 
Constant -4.11  -7.87 * 
  (0.17)   (0.08)   
Observations 816  627 
 
R2 0.08   0.08   





Effect of Nonfinancial Measures on CEO Bonus Pay Sensitivity to Shareholder Returns 
– Alternative Methodology 
 
The table presents coefficients (p-values) from the following regression: 
PPSit=β1Nonfinancialit+∑βkControlskit + α +εit,  (4) 
where PPSit is the firm-specific variable estimated from the following random effect model: 
Log(Bonusit )= β1iRETit + αi +εit,  (3) 
We replace Nonfinancialit with Nonfinancial Weightit in the second column.    
Dependent Variable = PPS(RET)  
Independent Variable Nonfinancial Nonfinancial Weight 
Nonfinancial 0.15 *** 0.34 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  
Board Size 0.15  0.08  
 
(0.14)  (0.50)  
Board Independence 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  
Firm Size 0.01  0.02  
 
(0.33)  (0.12)  
Firm Age 0.00 * 0.00 *** 
 
(0.06)  (0.00)  
Leverage -0.12  -0.13  
 
(0.19)  (0.26)  
Market-to-book 0.00  0.00  
 
(0.26)  (0.16)  
Financial Crisis -0.05  -0.04  
 
(0.30)  (0.56)  
Herfindahl Index 0.09  0.06  
 
(0.63)  (0.79)  
Industry  Yes  Yes  
Year  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.96 *** 0.81 *** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Observations 1,097  830  
R2 0.07  0.07  
PPS represents pay-performance sensitivity for each observation which is the coefficient (1i) from regression (3) 
estimated with the random effect model; All variables are defined in Table 2; *, **, and *** represents 









                                                        
1 These categories are similar to those used in Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997).  
2 NRG Metrics is a corporate governance and ownership database created by a team of market professionals 
and academic researchers in the field of corporate governance. 
3 Sun and Cahan (2009) argue that compensation committee quality can be either higher or lower when the size 
of the compensation committee is smaller. On the one hand, smaller boards can be more influenced by CEOs; 
but on the other hand, smaller boards may be more effective due to less free riding problems. As a robustness 
test, we measure board monitoring excluding compensation committee size as an alternative proxy for 
Monitoring and find similar results. 
4 For ease of presentation we exclude the firm subscript i and time subscript t from the tables of results and 
discussion within the document. 
5 When using Nonfinancial Weight as the dependent variable, which is a continuous variable, we use ordinary 
least square regressions with clustered standard errors.  
6 If market share data is not available in a particular industry/year combination, we set the Herfindahl Index to 
zero so as not to lose observations. Our results do not change qualitatively when we exclude observations 
without the Herfindahl index. 
7 Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006) and Shaw and Zhang (2010) use return on assets (ROA) instead of ROE 
as the accounting performance measure. 
8 They proxy CEO power with several variables – e.g. number of board members appointed after CEO 
appointment and duality - and find a negative relationship with Nonfinancial Weight.  
9 We also use an alternative grouping based on the board monitoring index: the group with low board 
monitoring includes observations where the index for Monitoring is less than 2 and the group with high board 
monitoring includes observations where Monitoring is greater than or equal to 2. In untabulated results, we find 
that the positive coefficient on Nonfinancial·RET only holds in the group with high board monitoring.  
 
